Gay Marriage
Can I just ask one question? If legalizing Gay Marriage doesn't serve to make people any less disgusted with Homosexuality, what will the Gay and Lesbian movement do next? If most Americans still look down on the behavior, what will be the next government policy to remedy this problem?
The gay movement assumes that marriage is some magic elixir that will end prejudice. In fact it will not. It may enable entitlement to social programs that should never have been there in the first place, but it will not end prejudice.
Recently there has been a proposal by Michael Kinsley that we get the government out of the business of sponsoring marriage. A follow-up by John O'Sullivan proposed a modified alternative of Kinsley's proposal.
Now back to my question: will this solve anything? No. The real problem, as I have stated before, is that homosexuals are upset with prejudice. The rest of the rhetoric doesn’t make sense. Sometimes the argument is that the benefits of marriage are a right, but that doesn’t hold water either. What right?
Kinsley actually gives the most honest assessment and proposal I have seen in a while. He clearly identifies why government is involved. There are certain points of the marriage contract that allow the greater society to benefit from the marriage contract being legally enforced by a third party. If there were an independent entity that could have that legal weight (namely churches, which would present a particular constitutional problem) I would not object to the privatization of marriage. Kinsley is correct that each of these things could be separately contracted and legalized. For instance we could begin to involve the government in the protection of children regardless of marriage. In fact, this is already happening because of people living together. Similar discussions could be had on each of the other points.
O’Sullivan follows up with a version that places church marriages in competition with civil marriages and partnerships to determine a winner. Churches would be free to define marriage however they wanted to. Besides raising the constitutional question of who defines a legal “church”, there is actually Supreme Court precedent that currently limits the rights of churches to marry whomever they please. This gets messy really fast. Does this precedent go away? Even if the government is out of the marriage business, do they still declare who churches can and can not marry?
The problem is not that this is necessarily a bad idea, but that it doesn’t solve the real problem. Let’s just assume for a second that we ‘privatize’ marriage as proposed under either proposal. And for the sake of argument let’s just say that we can all agree that polygamy, polyandry, incest, and weird stuff done with animals would still be banned. What will the gay movement do when they realize that people still look at a gay man with that odd look that denotes prejudice? What will they do when some teenagers in Wyoming kill a homosexual teenager in a cruel and horrible way? What will they do when prejudice doesn’t go away? Will they force churches to recognize gay marriages? What will be next?
I wish individuals like Andrew Sullivan would address this question.
There is a lot of tense debate about what is marriage and whether marriage would destroy the basis of society. But I think the real question is to ask how marriage will really achieve the goal that the gay movement has.
The gay movement advocates that marriage is a right. Okay, which of the Declaration of Independence rights does this “marriage right” fit under? Life? No, I think gay men are free to be alive. Liberty? There is no reason to believe that the founding fathers were talking about gay marriage, or any marriage for that matter. The same man who gets all the credit for the Declaration of Independence also gets much credit for the Bill of Rights—anything in there about marriage? Nope. Freedom of speech, religion, the press, bearing arms, from unreasonable criminal procedures maybe, but nothing about marriage—gay or straight. Pursuit of Happiness? This must be the one. Since marriage will make me happy I must have a right to it. Okay, jokes about married men not really being as happy as they thought they would be aside, we need to address this. Jefferson was modifying what John Locke really said. Pursuit of Happiness was originally Property. I for one think he did a great disservice by changing the words. I also think this was a subtle recognition, on his part, that slavery would be inconsistent since slaves were denied this basic right. Of course there are those who simply think that he was trying to spin the words and meant the same thing—pursuit of happiness only being possible by means of possession of property. On the issue of property I think gay couples have the best argument. After all many of the contractual advantages of marriage that government can grant are related to property and economics. Tax filing status and inheritance laws are two simple examples. But domestic partnership legislation in many states already attempts to address these inequities. If this is the only reason to pursue equal protection through marriage then maybe we should simply remove the government from this particular aspect of marriage or grant the same economic benefits to anyone who wants to contractually share financial liabilities. Even with all of that said, as a married person I am not sure that there are all that many property rights to get all that excited about. Tax filing status? It can be argued that in some cases I might be better off if I didn’t share the liability of my spouse. Inheritance? How about the flip side, inherited liability? I am convinced it is a wash. Not to mention that a simple will can achieve the same inheritance protection—therefore nothing is denied.
The real “right” is some nebulous right to share and express love or to be “normal”. As so many heterosexual couples who live together like to argue a certificate is not necessary to express love. Since I actually disagree with these couples, I admit that it does conjure up a level of commitment that is non-existent without the social pressure of marriage. But, where is the social pressure coming from?
The social pressure comes from established cultural tradition that says that marriage means some life long contract that is hard to break. Where did that tradition come from? The same religion and culture that says that homosexuals have no part in marriage! How can the homosexual movement advocate for access to a cultural norm that is so tightly bonded with a belief that homosexuality is a sin? Am I the only one who sees that there is something very illogical about all of this?
Which brings me back to the original question: what is next? Gay marriage will not cause people like myself to stop seeing homosexuality as a sin. While I agree that I cannot legislate MY morality, what will happen when my morality doesn’t change just because the government allows gays to marry? Will gays be satisfied? I personally doubt it. Some honest individuals may very well close up shop, but the movement leaders will never be satisfied. Name one civil rights movement that has declared victory and closed up shop. While individual gays may be satisfied, the gay movement will not.
Jul 11, 2003
Mr. Optimism
Every time I begin to fret about the economy I just go and read some commentary by Larry Kudlow or watch his show Kudlow and Cramer. His website links to his commentary, but I generally read him here or here.
Every time I begin to fret about the economy I just go and read some commentary by Larry Kudlow or watch his show Kudlow and Cramer. His website links to his commentary, but I generally read him here or here.
Jul 10, 2003
Write the Check and Bush will Sign!
I like this piece comparing Bush to Reagan on the issue of spending. The comparison reveals the truth about Bush being a big spender on anything Congress wants to spend on. I have made this point before right here. In fact, he is so bad I am beginning to disbelieve the argument that he does not want to embarass fellow Republicans.
I like this piece comparing Bush to Reagan on the issue of spending. The comparison reveals the truth about Bush being a big spender on anything Congress wants to spend on. I have made this point before right here. In fact, he is so bad I am beginning to disbelieve the argument that he does not want to embarass fellow Republicans.
Should Conservatives Leave the GOP?
National Review has raised the question of whether conservatives should leave the GOP. They raise some very good concerns. Regular readers will recognize that I am similarly concerned. The Republican Party is as close as we get to a Conservative party in American politics, but it fails to be Conservative when it counts. I have always believed that the key to the American political system is that the major parties attempt to build coalition parties by appealing to as many disparate interests as consistently possible. When I was in school my professors of political science liked to make comparisons between the proportional parliamentary systems of Europe and the American system. Often I found this comparison seemed to reveal a preference for the European system since it tends to include lesser parties. However, I found this somewhat ignorant of reality. In the end the European result is no different than in the US. The view of the lesser party is still negotiated away in a governing coalition. So if the compromise is before the election or after the election is there really a difference? I don't think so. The American system is admittedly a little more gradual, but the effect is the same. So when a Ross Perot comes on the political scene what was the response? Both major parties moved to seize the Perot issues that they felt were most naturally their issues—this resulted in a move to the middle of American politics. Is it any wonder then that in 2000 the significant third parties were on the fringes? Perot's party became a party for an extreme version of Conservatism with the nomination of Pat Buchanan, the Greens produced an extreme brand of liberalism, and the Libertarians arguably mixed the individual liberty extremes conservative and liberal ideals. Where will the next move be? If the parties are smart they will try to compromise to bring in those extremes. There is evidence that the Democrats are doing just that. Green activists frustrated by electoral failure are returning to the campaign of the most liberal Democratic candidate—Howard Dean. I admit I am over-generalizing, but the trend is in this direction. Republicans on the other hand are still fighting the Ross Perot threat. Bush is moving to the middle in a way that carries a very high risk that conservatives will break away if he is not more careful. He hopes to keep them in place by cutting taxes, spending on national defense, and making statements against abortion. For me the chink in the armor is the spending. But there is the potential for more problems as the National Review points out.
Is there a solution? One of the problems that conservatives have is that if we left the GOP we would have a hard time organizing. Greens have a clear vision, as do Libertarians. How do you start a party around the ideology of: 'keep it old'? There are parties out there that have tried by focusing on one issue or another (peruse this list to find many of the parties). The interesting thing is that National Review founder Bill Buckley has established a pattern. As I understand the history, he was key to organizing the Conservative Party of New York State. Election laws in New York allow the Conservative Party to be on the ballot for every election for every office. Many times they simply nominate the Republican candidate to be their candidate and the votes for the candidate are summed across various party nominations in order to determine the vote. This has the effect of allowing the party influence to be known while still allowing the election to gain a consensus. It also has allowed the Conservative party to threaten to nominate another candidate if the Republican candidate ignores all conservative issues. Of course it still means that you end up with moderate Republicans but at least it is understood what the stakes are. Unfortunately, not all states have written their election rules in such a way as to make the New York model work everywhere. If conservatives are frustrated with Republicans, then we should make it our cause to replicate nationally what has been done in New York. Along the way we need to define Conservatism and find a way to include existing fringe Conservative parties if possible. And like the Conservative Party of New York we should recognize that the party we will most often negotiate with would continue to be the Republican Party. I challenge National Review to put their heart where their words are and start the effort—take the Conservative Party national.
National Review has raised the question of whether conservatives should leave the GOP. They raise some very good concerns. Regular readers will recognize that I am similarly concerned. The Republican Party is as close as we get to a Conservative party in American politics, but it fails to be Conservative when it counts. I have always believed that the key to the American political system is that the major parties attempt to build coalition parties by appealing to as many disparate interests as consistently possible. When I was in school my professors of political science liked to make comparisons between the proportional parliamentary systems of Europe and the American system. Often I found this comparison seemed to reveal a preference for the European system since it tends to include lesser parties. However, I found this somewhat ignorant of reality. In the end the European result is no different than in the US. The view of the lesser party is still negotiated away in a governing coalition. So if the compromise is before the election or after the election is there really a difference? I don't think so. The American system is admittedly a little more gradual, but the effect is the same. So when a Ross Perot comes on the political scene what was the response? Both major parties moved to seize the Perot issues that they felt were most naturally their issues—this resulted in a move to the middle of American politics. Is it any wonder then that in 2000 the significant third parties were on the fringes? Perot's party became a party for an extreme version of Conservatism with the nomination of Pat Buchanan, the Greens produced an extreme brand of liberalism, and the Libertarians arguably mixed the individual liberty extremes conservative and liberal ideals. Where will the next move be? If the parties are smart they will try to compromise to bring in those extremes. There is evidence that the Democrats are doing just that. Green activists frustrated by electoral failure are returning to the campaign of the most liberal Democratic candidate—Howard Dean. I admit I am over-generalizing, but the trend is in this direction. Republicans on the other hand are still fighting the Ross Perot threat. Bush is moving to the middle in a way that carries a very high risk that conservatives will break away if he is not more careful. He hopes to keep them in place by cutting taxes, spending on national defense, and making statements against abortion. For me the chink in the armor is the spending. But there is the potential for more problems as the National Review points out.
Is there a solution? One of the problems that conservatives have is that if we left the GOP we would have a hard time organizing. Greens have a clear vision, as do Libertarians. How do you start a party around the ideology of: 'keep it old'? There are parties out there that have tried by focusing on one issue or another (peruse this list to find many of the parties). The interesting thing is that National Review founder Bill Buckley has established a pattern. As I understand the history, he was key to organizing the Conservative Party of New York State. Election laws in New York allow the Conservative Party to be on the ballot for every election for every office. Many times they simply nominate the Republican candidate to be their candidate and the votes for the candidate are summed across various party nominations in order to determine the vote. This has the effect of allowing the party influence to be known while still allowing the election to gain a consensus. It also has allowed the Conservative party to threaten to nominate another candidate if the Republican candidate ignores all conservative issues. Of course it still means that you end up with moderate Republicans but at least it is understood what the stakes are. Unfortunately, not all states have written their election rules in such a way as to make the New York model work everywhere. If conservatives are frustrated with Republicans, then we should make it our cause to replicate nationally what has been done in New York. Along the way we need to define Conservatism and find a way to include existing fringe Conservative parties if possible. And like the Conservative Party of New York we should recognize that the party we will most often negotiate with would continue to be the Republican Party. I challenge National Review to put their heart where their words are and start the effort—take the Conservative Party national.
Buzz Charts
I like this chart about the lack of inflation coming after cuts in income taxes (I also think it is worth taking a look at the website of the chart creator). Let me give my take on the real problem with the economy right now. Take a look at this article first. The problem is that the people who have lost jobs are disproportionately high-income college graduates. This has a numbing effect on the rest of the country. To begin with these people are disproportionately stock market investors who belong to the classification called 'upper middle class'--their stock market investments are largely retirement accounts. They have college degrees. They mostly jumped into computers in some way or another and their family members consider them the 'smart ones'. They earned high incomes and now that they are out of work they are willing to eat up savings, or run up debt, in order to wait for the right job rather than work at Wal-Mart. What impression does this behavior give family members? If my most successful sibling can't find a job, what should I conclude? How about the friend from high school who was doing well and now is unemployed? Is it any wonder that the stock market was hit so badly? The scary thing about this is that the fate of the economy can swing based on what economists call expectations. Simply put, if we all 'think' there is a recession our fears will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. And on the political front? Because the actual unemployed people are already mostly Republican they are being patient with Bush. But if a Ross Perot appeared on the stage you can be sure that Bush would lose a lot of votes thus ensuring another Democratic minority mandate.
I like this chart about the lack of inflation coming after cuts in income taxes (I also think it is worth taking a look at the website of the chart creator). Let me give my take on the real problem with the economy right now. Take a look at this article first. The problem is that the people who have lost jobs are disproportionately high-income college graduates. This has a numbing effect on the rest of the country. To begin with these people are disproportionately stock market investors who belong to the classification called 'upper middle class'--their stock market investments are largely retirement accounts. They have college degrees. They mostly jumped into computers in some way or another and their family members consider them the 'smart ones'. They earned high incomes and now that they are out of work they are willing to eat up savings, or run up debt, in order to wait for the right job rather than work at Wal-Mart. What impression does this behavior give family members? If my most successful sibling can't find a job, what should I conclude? How about the friend from high school who was doing well and now is unemployed? Is it any wonder that the stock market was hit so badly? The scary thing about this is that the fate of the economy can swing based on what economists call expectations. Simply put, if we all 'think' there is a recession our fears will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. And on the political front? Because the actual unemployed people are already mostly Republican they are being patient with Bush. But if a Ross Perot appeared on the stage you can be sure that Bush would lose a lot of votes thus ensuring another Democratic minority mandate.
Jul 9, 2003
Term Limits
About a month ago I read a piece by David Frum where he mentioned how he had come to be in favor of Congressional term limits. He credited a policy paper from the Cato Institution for his conversion. I took the invitation and read the paper--a very LONG paper. I agree that the paper is enlightening, but not to the same conclusion that it lead David Frum. The paper argues FOR term limits in order to increase Democracy, however I think the arguments used are weak.
A little background. Term limits, put simply, limit the number of terms an elected official can serve in the same office. My own journey on the issue of term limits really began when I realized that Ronald Reagan was term limited and Republicans would have to choose from a less than stellar field of candidates for replacement. It seemed the bitter fruits of a constitutional amendment after FDR's four terms. Politicians had reacted to FDR's virtual control on all power with a new rule to make it never happen again. While I am not sure of the historical arguments made at the time it would have been helpful for the policy paper to go back and contrast the history of that movement.
Admittedly, the policy paper only focuses on legislators by making the simple point that there is something inherently different about the executive and the legislature. I first started thinking specifically about Congressional term limits when Newt Gingrich included it in the Contract With America. As a Conservative Republican I was all for it. In my opinion it was a subtle rhetorical tool within the Contract. The message implied: 'throw the bums out!' And as a bonus, if we lost the 1994 Congressional Elections the message would be clear that had the rules of term limits been in place we would have won. This would further embolden party activists to stay involved. I was for it. I was tired of Democratic control of Congress. There seemed no way to defeat them in an election so I wanted a way to force the power brokers from power. But then we won the election.
In the years since many Congressional Republicans have retired because of a campaign promise they made to term limit themselves regardless. The irony to me has been that these have been the best, brightest, and most conservative members. Conservative in the sense that they understood that the power of the Federal Government and it's officials needed to be controlled. They understood that their word meant something. Yet, it was like unilateral disarmament. No career politicians retired out of shame to match the standard. And these great leaders have mostly disappeared into think tanks or Corporate America. Enforced term limits would have, of course, leveled the playing field and removed the career politicians but I stand by this: do we want to discard the good ones in order to rid ourselves of the bad ones? I for one do not.
The problem is clearly identified in the paper: entrenched legislators appear to wield a disproportionate influence on the outcome of legislative action. But, after reading the paper I am no longer convinced that term limits are the solution.
You see there is the possibility that the facts as presented are misleading. Sure there is no problem with the emotion that we should 'throw the bums out', but I am not convinced that the empirical data as presented proved any adverse effect to the voter electing the legislator.
The main data could be summarized as follows. Legislators seem to get more money appropriated as their length of service in legislative bodies increases. Further this increase is not just straight line—it appears to be exponential. On top of this there is evidence that long serving legislators fail to have strong opponents at election time in spite of not necessarily representing the true political position of the majority of voters they serve. Today we can see anecdotal evidence of both findings. Robert Byrd gets way more spending directed at West Virginia than is to be proportionately expected. Senators Kennedy, Helms, Thurmond, and Hollings might be examples of long serving legislators at political extremes relative to voters. And while the study did not take it this direction, one might sight choices like the choice voters made in South Dakota in 2002 in order to hopefully keep Senator Daschle in power in spite of being a Republican state.
The problems I see in the paper are as follows. It ignores the political reality of voter turnout. It does not address the question of whether or not term-limited legislatures have actually produced a result of less spending. It ignores the effect of one party states. And the argument is that the primary goal is to produce electoral egalitarianism, yet I wonder if this is really as democratic as argued.
The reality is that the electorate does not necessarily reflect the results of polls. If I ask all people if they favor X without asking the same people if they are voters I might distort the outcome. Furthermore, if I ask only the registered voters the same question without qualifying the likelihood that they actually WILL vote I once again can be in error. But, even if we assume that good methodologies were used in this respect, is it really inconsistent of a voter to want to get rid of the bums yet vote for their own legislator? This behavior can actually be consistent with the concept of acting in my own self-interest. Removing my ability to act in this way limits my freedom. Even ignoring this the political reality is that many voters are not aware of the positions of a politician. In fact, they vote based on the encouragement of political organizations that they trust. The ability of a politician to manipulate these organizations is most significant in legislative races where the district is not covered by natural media markets.
If term limits will produce less pork barrel spending then why not show actual evidence of this? In 1998 there may not have been enough data. But, today there should be evidence. I suspect that the data would not prove the hypothesis presented in the paper. Why? I think two seemingly unrelated points in the paper give us the answer. In one place the author argues that term limits will bring fresh faces into politics because more seats will be openly contested. This seems like a populist idea that I can favor. Yet, in another place in the paper the author responds to the complaint about losing experienced politicians to term limits by pointing out that experienced politicians simply exchange seats in different bodies when term limits take effect. Is there a contradiction here? Yes. Each body has fresh faces, but in terms of the overall political map the faces are all the same, only the offices have changed. This implies to me that there would be no difference in the pork barrel effect since party power and lobbyist power is a continuing effect regardless of particular office. It may be a little more complicated but I still can influence spending by calling in favors that extend over multiple offices served, thereby capitalizing on my experience. In effect the career politician is still a career politician. If this were not true there would be a strong disincentive for politicians to make office switches in spite of no term limits.
What about one party states or districts? This distorts the analysis in a way that the author failed to address. Something like 20-30% of politicians on either side of the aisle may be a believer in ideological principles. The other 40-60% of politicians are in politics because they love the stuff (my numbers are not empirical, but there is likely some true proportion like this). No matter what the 40-60% of politicians that are true believers will join the party most likely to reflect their views and will only be elected if they are either really charismatic or happen to live in a district that disproportionately has the same political views. The other politicians make a choice at some point in life. They choose a party based on the likelihood of election. In a two party state this means that they come down about half and half and you get interesting politicians who sometimes have a mixed bag of political views. These are prime targets for party jumping. In a one party state these politicians join the party in power in mass. This causes political distortions. The biggest distortion is that the party in power has greater influence on controlling the competitiveness of elections. The party can keep back strong primary challengers by awarding alternative positions of power from which to gain name recognition for future challenges. Meanwhile there is no hope for the opponent from the opposition party since there is little organization and voter registration follows the same pattern as the registration of politicians. Much analysis of Congressional elections shows that the reason incumbents do so well in reelection is because the party disproportionately controls that district and is able to control the internal competition. Very few districts have equal party registration and therefore are unlikely to offer a high level of competition. Because of this long serving incumbents are more than likely from a district that is non-competitive. The paper avoided looking for data on this. Short serving incumbents, the ones with the competitive elections, are more than likely from districts that are drawn to be competitive. The point being that a 98% reelection rate for House members is somewhat misleading. If anything it is not a case for term limits, since the party distribution would be the same and therefore ensure the same favors taking place, but a case for changing the way that we draw Congressional districts (I offer the contrast of Senate party control with that of House party control as evidence).
Which brings me to what is the real purpose of term limits. I will be honest. I was in favor in 1994 for one reason: I wanted to get rid of Democratic control of Congress by any means available. And more recently, until I read this paper, I was opposed since I like having Republicans in control (at least more than Democrats). No other reason. Nothing idealistic about that. But now I have a reason. The case in the paper is that it is needed to level the playing field for the voter. If we all have term-limited legislators then we will all have the same access to things like pork barrel and influence since there will not be experience disparities. But if that is the case why not adopt the model of one term only? Why not one political office during any citizen’s lifetime? Why is three terms in the House appropriate? The real argument is egalitarian in nature. I reject the notion that I can’t choose to accept a legislator that is not in 100% agreement with me and not be making a good decision. At the end of the day even blacks voted for Strom Thurmond. Why? Because they concluded that the issue of race was a big enough issue that Strom would never have enough power to independently influence, but he could have enough power to bring back the pork to South Carolina. Voters do this all the time. Why take away the freedom to make this choice? Why take away the advantage that this can offer to my district? When the paper was written in 1998 California had yet to complete the transition to term limits. Does anyone want to use their fiscal crisis today as an argument that term limits worked in either the legislature or the governorship? I personally think that term limits were irrelevant in this crisis, but what is relevant is that spending patterns did not trend downward with term limits, and I would guess pork barrel spending was no lower than without term limits. Furthermore, I would guess that there are still disparities, but that the disparities are more consistent with party distribution than with individual districts.
The case for term limits is a good one when you are left out of power. In power it is harder to buy. Is this hypocritical? Yes. I admit it. But, on principle a true conservative or libertarian should ask the question of why the founders left out a term limiting provision. They surely could see that long serving Members of Parliament and Prime Ministers in England had as bad an effect as the King. Surely the problem we see today is not a new problem for a Republic. I think that they believed that the separation of powers would solve this problem well enough. Or maybe they felt it was a necessary evil. Whatever the case may be the arguments in this paper are not compelling enough of a reason to undo what the founders put in place.
About a month ago I read a piece by David Frum where he mentioned how he had come to be in favor of Congressional term limits. He credited a policy paper from the Cato Institution for his conversion. I took the invitation and read the paper--a very LONG paper. I agree that the paper is enlightening, but not to the same conclusion that it lead David Frum. The paper argues FOR term limits in order to increase Democracy, however I think the arguments used are weak.
A little background. Term limits, put simply, limit the number of terms an elected official can serve in the same office. My own journey on the issue of term limits really began when I realized that Ronald Reagan was term limited and Republicans would have to choose from a less than stellar field of candidates for replacement. It seemed the bitter fruits of a constitutional amendment after FDR's four terms. Politicians had reacted to FDR's virtual control on all power with a new rule to make it never happen again. While I am not sure of the historical arguments made at the time it would have been helpful for the policy paper to go back and contrast the history of that movement.
Admittedly, the policy paper only focuses on legislators by making the simple point that there is something inherently different about the executive and the legislature. I first started thinking specifically about Congressional term limits when Newt Gingrich included it in the Contract With America. As a Conservative Republican I was all for it. In my opinion it was a subtle rhetorical tool within the Contract. The message implied: 'throw the bums out!' And as a bonus, if we lost the 1994 Congressional Elections the message would be clear that had the rules of term limits been in place we would have won. This would further embolden party activists to stay involved. I was for it. I was tired of Democratic control of Congress. There seemed no way to defeat them in an election so I wanted a way to force the power brokers from power. But then we won the election.
In the years since many Congressional Republicans have retired because of a campaign promise they made to term limit themselves regardless. The irony to me has been that these have been the best, brightest, and most conservative members. Conservative in the sense that they understood that the power of the Federal Government and it's officials needed to be controlled. They understood that their word meant something. Yet, it was like unilateral disarmament. No career politicians retired out of shame to match the standard. And these great leaders have mostly disappeared into think tanks or Corporate America. Enforced term limits would have, of course, leveled the playing field and removed the career politicians but I stand by this: do we want to discard the good ones in order to rid ourselves of the bad ones? I for one do not.
The problem is clearly identified in the paper: entrenched legislators appear to wield a disproportionate influence on the outcome of legislative action. But, after reading the paper I am no longer convinced that term limits are the solution.
You see there is the possibility that the facts as presented are misleading. Sure there is no problem with the emotion that we should 'throw the bums out', but I am not convinced that the empirical data as presented proved any adverse effect to the voter electing the legislator.
The main data could be summarized as follows. Legislators seem to get more money appropriated as their length of service in legislative bodies increases. Further this increase is not just straight line—it appears to be exponential. On top of this there is evidence that long serving legislators fail to have strong opponents at election time in spite of not necessarily representing the true political position of the majority of voters they serve. Today we can see anecdotal evidence of both findings. Robert Byrd gets way more spending directed at West Virginia than is to be proportionately expected. Senators Kennedy, Helms, Thurmond, and Hollings might be examples of long serving legislators at political extremes relative to voters. And while the study did not take it this direction, one might sight choices like the choice voters made in South Dakota in 2002 in order to hopefully keep Senator Daschle in power in spite of being a Republican state.
The problems I see in the paper are as follows. It ignores the political reality of voter turnout. It does not address the question of whether or not term-limited legislatures have actually produced a result of less spending. It ignores the effect of one party states. And the argument is that the primary goal is to produce electoral egalitarianism, yet I wonder if this is really as democratic as argued.
The reality is that the electorate does not necessarily reflect the results of polls. If I ask all people if they favor X without asking the same people if they are voters I might distort the outcome. Furthermore, if I ask only the registered voters the same question without qualifying the likelihood that they actually WILL vote I once again can be in error. But, even if we assume that good methodologies were used in this respect, is it really inconsistent of a voter to want to get rid of the bums yet vote for their own legislator? This behavior can actually be consistent with the concept of acting in my own self-interest. Removing my ability to act in this way limits my freedom. Even ignoring this the political reality is that many voters are not aware of the positions of a politician. In fact, they vote based on the encouragement of political organizations that they trust. The ability of a politician to manipulate these organizations is most significant in legislative races where the district is not covered by natural media markets.
If term limits will produce less pork barrel spending then why not show actual evidence of this? In 1998 there may not have been enough data. But, today there should be evidence. I suspect that the data would not prove the hypothesis presented in the paper. Why? I think two seemingly unrelated points in the paper give us the answer. In one place the author argues that term limits will bring fresh faces into politics because more seats will be openly contested. This seems like a populist idea that I can favor. Yet, in another place in the paper the author responds to the complaint about losing experienced politicians to term limits by pointing out that experienced politicians simply exchange seats in different bodies when term limits take effect. Is there a contradiction here? Yes. Each body has fresh faces, but in terms of the overall political map the faces are all the same, only the offices have changed. This implies to me that there would be no difference in the pork barrel effect since party power and lobbyist power is a continuing effect regardless of particular office. It may be a little more complicated but I still can influence spending by calling in favors that extend over multiple offices served, thereby capitalizing on my experience. In effect the career politician is still a career politician. If this were not true there would be a strong disincentive for politicians to make office switches in spite of no term limits.
What about one party states or districts? This distorts the analysis in a way that the author failed to address. Something like 20-30% of politicians on either side of the aisle may be a believer in ideological principles. The other 40-60% of politicians are in politics because they love the stuff (my numbers are not empirical, but there is likely some true proportion like this). No matter what the 40-60% of politicians that are true believers will join the party most likely to reflect their views and will only be elected if they are either really charismatic or happen to live in a district that disproportionately has the same political views. The other politicians make a choice at some point in life. They choose a party based on the likelihood of election. In a two party state this means that they come down about half and half and you get interesting politicians who sometimes have a mixed bag of political views. These are prime targets for party jumping. In a one party state these politicians join the party in power in mass. This causes political distortions. The biggest distortion is that the party in power has greater influence on controlling the competitiveness of elections. The party can keep back strong primary challengers by awarding alternative positions of power from which to gain name recognition for future challenges. Meanwhile there is no hope for the opponent from the opposition party since there is little organization and voter registration follows the same pattern as the registration of politicians. Much analysis of Congressional elections shows that the reason incumbents do so well in reelection is because the party disproportionately controls that district and is able to control the internal competition. Very few districts have equal party registration and therefore are unlikely to offer a high level of competition. Because of this long serving incumbents are more than likely from a district that is non-competitive. The paper avoided looking for data on this. Short serving incumbents, the ones with the competitive elections, are more than likely from districts that are drawn to be competitive. The point being that a 98% reelection rate for House members is somewhat misleading. If anything it is not a case for term limits, since the party distribution would be the same and therefore ensure the same favors taking place, but a case for changing the way that we draw Congressional districts (I offer the contrast of Senate party control with that of House party control as evidence).
Which brings me to what is the real purpose of term limits. I will be honest. I was in favor in 1994 for one reason: I wanted to get rid of Democratic control of Congress by any means available. And more recently, until I read this paper, I was opposed since I like having Republicans in control (at least more than Democrats). No other reason. Nothing idealistic about that. But now I have a reason. The case in the paper is that it is needed to level the playing field for the voter. If we all have term-limited legislators then we will all have the same access to things like pork barrel and influence since there will not be experience disparities. But if that is the case why not adopt the model of one term only? Why not one political office during any citizen’s lifetime? Why is three terms in the House appropriate? The real argument is egalitarian in nature. I reject the notion that I can’t choose to accept a legislator that is not in 100% agreement with me and not be making a good decision. At the end of the day even blacks voted for Strom Thurmond. Why? Because they concluded that the issue of race was a big enough issue that Strom would never have enough power to independently influence, but he could have enough power to bring back the pork to South Carolina. Voters do this all the time. Why take away the freedom to make this choice? Why take away the advantage that this can offer to my district? When the paper was written in 1998 California had yet to complete the transition to term limits. Does anyone want to use their fiscal crisis today as an argument that term limits worked in either the legislature or the governorship? I personally think that term limits were irrelevant in this crisis, but what is relevant is that spending patterns did not trend downward with term limits, and I would guess pork barrel spending was no lower than without term limits. Furthermore, I would guess that there are still disparities, but that the disparities are more consistent with party distribution than with individual districts.
The case for term limits is a good one when you are left out of power. In power it is harder to buy. Is this hypocritical? Yes. I admit it. But, on principle a true conservative or libertarian should ask the question of why the founders left out a term limiting provision. They surely could see that long serving Members of Parliament and Prime Ministers in England had as bad an effect as the King. Surely the problem we see today is not a new problem for a Republic. I think that they believed that the separation of powers would solve this problem well enough. Or maybe they felt it was a necessary evil. Whatever the case may be the arguments in this paper are not compelling enough of a reason to undo what the founders put in place.
Jul 8, 2003
Democracy
There is often a quip made about how democracy is like sausage -- if you saw how it was made you wouldn't eat it. I think this gets thrown around far too often without anyone really pondering the metaphor. Would I really not eat sausage? Okay, they grind up meat, fat, ligaments, cartilage, and just about anything that is left over after they make all the expensive cuts of beef, pork, turkey, etc. They then take that meat and stuff it in a cleaned out intestine after adding whatever seasoning and coloring is necessary to make it have it's final appearance and taste. Now it is demystified, do you really not want to eat it? I still eat it. The point is that I don't mind looking under the hood (oops, I'm mixing metaphors). I realize that there is a process of give and take that produces final results. In fact, understanding the messy process that politics is, makes me more patient with some of the dumb compromises that are produced. Sure, like some kinds of sausage, I do not like some of the outcomes, but that doesn't make me sick about the process.
Let's take for example the current legislation on Medicare reform and a prescription drug benefit. At the end of the day this can only pass if there is a compromise with some Democrats. The thing is a mess. I don't like it. But, I don't like it because I long ago decided that it didn't matter what the flavor of the sausage was, I would not like Medicare reform. Too many Conservatives are bemoaning the process when in reality it is the flavor of sausage that is bad.
Why? Because it is a mistake.
The government should never have been in the business of ensuring medical coverage to anyone. Sure, we don't want old SICK people wandering the streets. But, medical coverage was once a pay as you get sick proposition, then someone came up with the idea of insurance against the bad things, and somewhere along the way it was discovered that it was not a good financial proposition for businesses to sell insurance to old people. After all, they tend to get sick and suffer from bad things like cancer and heart problems at relatively high rates. People felt bad for the old folks and decided that we should care for them. While not a bad motive, it was a bad idea. A young person like myself wonders: 'how did all the old people get along before Medicare?' It appears that they simply passed away, skipping the expensive procedures, or relied on family members to care for them.
Does the government have to solve everything? That is the real problem. At least Liberals are honest--they want the government to solve everything and they campaign on this. Granted many of them lose the vision and try to act like they care about deficits or personal liberties or something else. But at the end of the day they want to solve problems with government solutions. They are convinced that they can fix anything with a law and some money.
I attended a high school that was famous for having some really rough and tough students. Our football team would literally kick ass every year, as did our wrestling team. Sports that did not depend on brute force, like baseball and men's volleyball, were somewhat less successful. Granted we were also famous for our high school marching band, but we had to do something with all the nerds. Anyway, after one particular football game, where we beat the snot out of the opponent, some dumb students decided to stone the opposing teams bus. They also stoned the other teams band bus. Some kids got hurt. Existing rules were put into place to punish our school. Most notably, we were banned from playing night games. It all seemed appropriate and the principle suspended the offenders (who by the way were mad because they had been kicked out of the game by school officials for drunkenness, etc.). The State Representative from the district where the stoned high school was from proposed legislation to require that the state guarantee the safety of all students. Students from the victimized high school appeared to testify for the bill. I was a legislative intern and organized some of our own students to testify against this measure (yes, all the band nerds). I give the entire back-story to make two points. The State Representative was desperate to look like she was doing "something" to protect the people of her district. There was a problem, and she was going to solve it. But the problem was already dealt with. There was no need to do anything. Fortunately, the legislation died.
Like Bob the Builder, if there is a problem Liberals can fix it. This was the crux of the liberal democratic coalition that FDR used to build his tent. LBJ successfully added new groups under the tent with the only requirement for entry being suffering at the hands of tradition. Medicare is the offspring of the orgy in that tent. I may be mixing all kinds of metaphors again, but the point is simply that Medicare was meant to fix things.
Politicians like to show voters that they are doing something. This is why Liberals and being lifelong politicians are such a natural match. The problem is for Republicans. Conservatives don't think that government should try to fix every problem. We realize that there will be some suffering along the way, but we hesitant to disrupt existing systems. We elect Republicans, but we are not enough in numbers that the Republican politician can simply sit in Congress and vote no on every measure and hope to be reelected. The swing moderate voters out there would interpret that as Republicans doing nothing.
This was the electoral secret to Newt Gingrinch's Contract with America. It was a plan for doing SOMETHING. For 30 years voters went to the polls and were faced with a choice. Liberal Tom says he will do something, Conservative Bob says there is nothing to do. But I would like to see the freeway expanded and that takes money... hmmmmm... I guess I will vote for the Liberal and hope that he doesn't get out of control. It goes a lot deeper than this, but let's go on. Newt came along and proposed an agenda for doing SOMETHING. Voters now had a reason to vote for Republicans and the landscape changed.
Let's look at another example. Why are Republicans so sure that Ross Perot voters would have mostly voted Republican? Because Ross Perot was not pushing a Liberal agenda, but an agenda period. He wanted to do something, but he seemed grounded in much of the same vision that the Contract with America espoused.
Consequently, the smart Republicans find a way to appear active in doing SOMETHING. Today Bush is ready to sign anything on Medicare so that come election time he can prove that he has done SOMETHING. Tax cuts are something as well. His tax cuts have never been about sound theory, just about doing something. Organizing the Department of Homeland Security? Doing something.
The problem is that there are consequences to doing something. There are costs. Which brings me back to the real point. Medicare was a bad idea to begin with. To make changes to the system here or there is just like debating whether to build a skyscraper with 50 stories or 60 stories. If the skyscraper is a bad idea it doesn't matter how many stories it has.
Medicare is bad idea because it distorts the economy. It distorts the investment in medical research. A simple example of this distortion. There would be little discussion about Do Not Resuscitate orders and assisted suicide if there was no Medicare. Simply put, many elderly people would conclude that their time has come and they would simply not go to the hospital. Is this harsh? Absolutely. But by making the point to spend as much as possible to save the oldest people we then created a new moral dilemma about when to stop. Why not remove the distortion and allow the individual to conclude that it is not worth the financial burden to family? As it is there is no reason for an elderly person to worry about a burden on people they love since the costs are diffused to the point that the family considers the Medicare a right.
And what does this have to do with the sausage? I can't expect President Bush to resist the temptation to improve the sausage. But at the end of the day I don't like the sausage--no matter the flavor enhancement.
There is often a quip made about how democracy is like sausage -- if you saw how it was made you wouldn't eat it. I think this gets thrown around far too often without anyone really pondering the metaphor. Would I really not eat sausage? Okay, they grind up meat, fat, ligaments, cartilage, and just about anything that is left over after they make all the expensive cuts of beef, pork, turkey, etc. They then take that meat and stuff it in a cleaned out intestine after adding whatever seasoning and coloring is necessary to make it have it's final appearance and taste. Now it is demystified, do you really not want to eat it? I still eat it. The point is that I don't mind looking under the hood (oops, I'm mixing metaphors). I realize that there is a process of give and take that produces final results. In fact, understanding the messy process that politics is, makes me more patient with some of the dumb compromises that are produced. Sure, like some kinds of sausage, I do not like some of the outcomes, but that doesn't make me sick about the process.
Let's take for example the current legislation on Medicare reform and a prescription drug benefit. At the end of the day this can only pass if there is a compromise with some Democrats. The thing is a mess. I don't like it. But, I don't like it because I long ago decided that it didn't matter what the flavor of the sausage was, I would not like Medicare reform. Too many Conservatives are bemoaning the process when in reality it is the flavor of sausage that is bad.
Why? Because it is a mistake.
The government should never have been in the business of ensuring medical coverage to anyone. Sure, we don't want old SICK people wandering the streets. But, medical coverage was once a pay as you get sick proposition, then someone came up with the idea of insurance against the bad things, and somewhere along the way it was discovered that it was not a good financial proposition for businesses to sell insurance to old people. After all, they tend to get sick and suffer from bad things like cancer and heart problems at relatively high rates. People felt bad for the old folks and decided that we should care for them. While not a bad motive, it was a bad idea. A young person like myself wonders: 'how did all the old people get along before Medicare?' It appears that they simply passed away, skipping the expensive procedures, or relied on family members to care for them.
Does the government have to solve everything? That is the real problem. At least Liberals are honest--they want the government to solve everything and they campaign on this. Granted many of them lose the vision and try to act like they care about deficits or personal liberties or something else. But at the end of the day they want to solve problems with government solutions. They are convinced that they can fix anything with a law and some money.
I attended a high school that was famous for having some really rough and tough students. Our football team would literally kick ass every year, as did our wrestling team. Sports that did not depend on brute force, like baseball and men's volleyball, were somewhat less successful. Granted we were also famous for our high school marching band, but we had to do something with all the nerds. Anyway, after one particular football game, where we beat the snot out of the opponent, some dumb students decided to stone the opposing teams bus. They also stoned the other teams band bus. Some kids got hurt. Existing rules were put into place to punish our school. Most notably, we were banned from playing night games. It all seemed appropriate and the principle suspended the offenders (who by the way were mad because they had been kicked out of the game by school officials for drunkenness, etc.). The State Representative from the district where the stoned high school was from proposed legislation to require that the state guarantee the safety of all students. Students from the victimized high school appeared to testify for the bill. I was a legislative intern and organized some of our own students to testify against this measure (yes, all the band nerds). I give the entire back-story to make two points. The State Representative was desperate to look like she was doing "something" to protect the people of her district. There was a problem, and she was going to solve it. But the problem was already dealt with. There was no need to do anything. Fortunately, the legislation died.
Like Bob the Builder, if there is a problem Liberals can fix it. This was the crux of the liberal democratic coalition that FDR used to build his tent. LBJ successfully added new groups under the tent with the only requirement for entry being suffering at the hands of tradition. Medicare is the offspring of the orgy in that tent. I may be mixing all kinds of metaphors again, but the point is simply that Medicare was meant to fix things.
Politicians like to show voters that they are doing something. This is why Liberals and being lifelong politicians are such a natural match. The problem is for Republicans. Conservatives don't think that government should try to fix every problem. We realize that there will be some suffering along the way, but we hesitant to disrupt existing systems. We elect Republicans, but we are not enough in numbers that the Republican politician can simply sit in Congress and vote no on every measure and hope to be reelected. The swing moderate voters out there would interpret that as Republicans doing nothing.
This was the electoral secret to Newt Gingrinch's Contract with America. It was a plan for doing SOMETHING. For 30 years voters went to the polls and were faced with a choice. Liberal Tom says he will do something, Conservative Bob says there is nothing to do. But I would like to see the freeway expanded and that takes money... hmmmmm... I guess I will vote for the Liberal and hope that he doesn't get out of control. It goes a lot deeper than this, but let's go on. Newt came along and proposed an agenda for doing SOMETHING. Voters now had a reason to vote for Republicans and the landscape changed.
Let's look at another example. Why are Republicans so sure that Ross Perot voters would have mostly voted Republican? Because Ross Perot was not pushing a Liberal agenda, but an agenda period. He wanted to do something, but he seemed grounded in much of the same vision that the Contract with America espoused.
Consequently, the smart Republicans find a way to appear active in doing SOMETHING. Today Bush is ready to sign anything on Medicare so that come election time he can prove that he has done SOMETHING. Tax cuts are something as well. His tax cuts have never been about sound theory, just about doing something. Organizing the Department of Homeland Security? Doing something.
The problem is that there are consequences to doing something. There are costs. Which brings me back to the real point. Medicare was a bad idea to begin with. To make changes to the system here or there is just like debating whether to build a skyscraper with 50 stories or 60 stories. If the skyscraper is a bad idea it doesn't matter how many stories it has.
Medicare is bad idea because it distorts the economy. It distorts the investment in medical research. A simple example of this distortion. There would be little discussion about Do Not Resuscitate orders and assisted suicide if there was no Medicare. Simply put, many elderly people would conclude that their time has come and they would simply not go to the hospital. Is this harsh? Absolutely. But by making the point to spend as much as possible to save the oldest people we then created a new moral dilemma about when to stop. Why not remove the distortion and allow the individual to conclude that it is not worth the financial burden to family? As it is there is no reason for an elderly person to worry about a burden on people they love since the costs are diffused to the point that the family considers the Medicare a right.
And what does this have to do with the sausage? I can't expect President Bush to resist the temptation to improve the sausage. But at the end of the day I don't like the sausage--no matter the flavor enhancement.
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